In 1787, the United States had a new Constitution but many Americans were unsure whether the national government would become too powerful. To persuade the public, supporters of the Constitution wrote essays explaining how the new system would work. This document is one of those essays. It focuses on how the government’s structure — dividing power among different branches — was designed to prevent any one group or leader from gaining too much control while still allowing the government to function.
To the People of the State of New York:
TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several branches of the government, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer is this: since outside protections are not enough, the problem must be solved by designing the government so its different parts, through their relationships, keep each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will warn of a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention.
In order to lay a foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted by everyone to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each branch should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in deciding who gets to be members of the others. Were this principle rigorously followed, it would make sure that all those in the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary would get their power from the same fountain of authority, the people, without choosing each other for the roles. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several branches would be less difficult in practice than it may appear. Putting this into practice, however, will be difficult. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be not a good idea to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because specific qualifications are essential in the members, the most important thing is choosing a method of selecting officials that makes sure they are qualified. Also, because judges keep their positions for a long time, they will soon stop depending on whoever chose them.
It is equally evident, that the members of each branch should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the salary and benefits attached to their jobs. Were the head of the executive, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular instance, their independence in every thing else would be not real. But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. Defenses against this should be as strong as the danger they are meant to guard against. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such rules should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place convince it to control itself.
A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of additional precautions. We use competing interests to control bad behavior, not just good intentions and this happens in both government and daily life. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, offices should be set up to check each other, so people protecting their own power also end up protecting everyone’s rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less required in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State. But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily is the most important. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified.
Glossary
partition - a division into parts
constituted - officially formed or set up
agency - involvement or role in making something happen
deviations - actions that move away from the normal rule or path
encroachments - gradual taking of power or rights
ambition - strong desire for power or achievement
subordinate - lower in rank or authority
prudence - careful judgment and wise decision-making